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Abstract
This paper analyzes the growth impact of ﬁscal and institutional govern-
mental policies in a regional context. The government provides a productive
input that is complementary to private capital. Institutional policies include
the decision about the type of public input as well as on the size of the region
as determined by the number of ﬁrms. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of
the public input. Private capital accumulation incurs adjustment costs that
depend upon the ratio between private and public investment. After deriving
the decentralized equilibrium, ﬁscal and institutional policies as well as their
interdependencies and welfare implications are discussed. Due to the feedback
eﬀects both policies may not be determined independently. It is also shown
that depending on the region’s size diﬀerent types of the public input maximize
growth.
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hannover.de1 Introduction
One of the main topics addressed during the last several years within growth eco-
nomics has been to point at the fundamental role of institutions in the growth
process. Within most models, institutions are referred to as economic, legal or so-
cial arrangements (see e. g. North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995) or Acemoglu
et al. (2001, 2005)). More precise formulations include the focus on property rights
protection or regulations in ﬁnancial, labor or product markets (see e. g. Eicher and
García-Peñalosa (2006)). Most recent discussions refer to ’appropriate’ institutions
that are based on the seminal work of Gerschenkron (1962) and argue that diﬀer-
ent types of institutions or policies maximize growth (see e. g. Aghion and Howitt
(2005), Rodrik (2005) or Acemoglu et al. (2006)).
This paper confers the discussion of the institutions’ impact on growth at a regional
level and extends it with respect to its contribution within a comprehensive govern-
mental policy mix. As growth determinant serves a governmentally provided public
production input that – depending on its characteristics – may be interpreted in
a diﬀerent manner, e. g. as basic research, road networks or regional public goods
as harbors or airports. The analysis is carried out in the context of an endogenous
growth model that is incorporated in a multi–region economy. The regions may be
distinguished with respect to their size and possibly the type of productive input
provided by the government. With this respect the model is based on the seminal
work of Barro (1990). In analogy to Turnovsky (1996) the public input acts as com-
plement to private capital within the production process, increases private capital
productivity and may impact on the ﬁrm’s adjustment costs. Institutional policies
include the decision on the type of the governmental input as characterized by the
prevailing degree of congestion as well as the choice of the economy’s size. The latter
argument gains importance e. g. in the discussion about the EU enlargement or de-
cisions at a regional level about the extent of metropolitan areas. The governmental
input is provided free of charge to the individuals, hence taxes are levied to ﬁnance
the provision. It is assumed that the governmental budget balances in each period.
Consequently ﬁscal policy simultaneously includes the decision on the tax rates but
also on the size of the public input.
The emphasis is laid on the relationship between speciﬁc governmental policies and
regional growth. With this it is possible to answer e. g. questions like: How big
1should an economy be? Which public input should be provided by the local govern-
ment? Which growth impact is incorporated in certain ﬁscal or institutional policies
respectively? Which determinants characterize an optimal policy mix? It is shown
that politicians have substantial room for creatively packaging alternative instru-
ments into a policy mix that is sensitive to local opportunities and constraints. In
addition it becomes obvious that it is not possible to derive a unique policy recom-
mendation but that regional peculiarities have to be carefully considered if the goal
of maximizing growth is to be sustained.
The paper is organized as follows: After presenting the analytical framework in
part 2, the equilibrium in the decentralized economy is derived in Section 3 and
its economic implications are discussed. Section 4 focuses on welfare and the in-
terdependencies between ﬁscal and institutional policies. Subsequently numerical
simulations are carried out since it is not possible to derive closed–form solutions
of the model. Section 6 concludes while some formal details are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The analytical framework
Regional aspects and production technology We consider a multi–region economy in
which a benchmark region with total population size normalized to N = 1 is used as
numeraire. It is assumed that the other regions are populated with N > 1 identical
individuals. This speciﬁcation has two major advantages: It allows to (i) analyze
the growth impact of governmental policies for regions of diﬀerent sizes and (ii) to
consider the scale impact of alternative institutional settings within the model. The
latter argument will be detailed during the further presentation of the model.
Output of a single ﬁrm is determined by privately owned capital, k, and the individ-
ually available amount of public services, Gs.1 The governmental input is ﬁnanced
1With this speciﬁcation of the production function the paper draws back on the seminal work of
Barro (1990) and Edwards (1990). Extensions are carried out by Glomm and Ravikumar (1994a,
1994b), or Fisher and Turnovsky (1998). An overview of the most relevant arguments is given in
Turnovsky (2000).
2by taxes and is provided free of charge.2 The individual’s production function
y = f(k,Gs) (1)
is homogenous of degree one in the two inputs.
The productive services derived by the representative individual from a given amount
of public expenditure, G, depend upon the usage of his individual capital stock
relative to aggregate usage. This describes the situation of relative congestion that
is introduced via a typical congestion function
Gs = Gk
σK
−σ 0 ≤ σ (2)
where K denotes the aggregate stock of private capital (see e. g. Barro and Sala-
I-Martin (1992) or Eicher and Turnovsky (2000)). The case σ = 0 corresponds
to a nonrival pure public input whereas σ = 1 reﬂects a situation of proportional
(relative) congestion. Accordingly, the cases 0 < σ < 1 correspond to situations of
partial (relative) congestion, in the sense that given the individual stock of capital,
government spending can increase at slower rate than does K and still provide a
ﬁxed level of services to the ﬁrm. The situation σ = 0 may be interpreted as a
situation in which the government provides a pure public good, e. g. basic research.
Its usage by one ﬁrm does not aﬀect possible usages of the others. In contrast to
this, σ ≤ 1 corresponds e. g. to the provision of a road network. In extreme it is
proportionally congested and each of the N individuals within the region may use
G/N parts for production. As Turnovsky (1996, p. 364) argues, the case σ > 1
describes a situation where congestion is so great that the public input must grow
faster than the economy in order for the level of services provided to the individual
ﬁrm remain constant. This case is unlikely at the aggregate level, but may well be
plausible for local public goods (see Edwards (1990)). A local public good could
be a harbor that is provided by the regional government. Nevertheless it also may
be used by individuals coming from outside the region. Note that usually within
this type of growth model population size is normalized to unity. This speciﬁcation
suppresses scale eﬀects within the resulting growth rate that empirically seem to
be well implausible at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, scale eﬀects are due to
the phenomenon that a public input characterized by partial rivalry can be used by
2A discussion of the growth implications of a partly excludable public input can be found in
Ott and Turnovsky (2006).
3additional ﬁrms at relatively low costs. Hence, the normalization is done at the cost
of several other eﬀects and policy implications which then are also hidden. This gap
will be addressed within this paper.
We assume that the government sets its aggregate expenditure in proportion to the
aggregate capital stock so that g ≡ G/K in order to allow for steady state growth.





′ > 0 α
′′ < 0 (3)
thus allowing for sustained growth. The term α represents a convex productivity
function.
Capital accumulation and installation costs: The process of capital accumulation
involves installation costs according to








′ > 0 φ
′′ ≥ 0 φ(0) = 0 (4)
where ı denotes private investment.4 The functional form φ has to be linear–
homogenous of degree zero in the two arguments if a steady–state equilibrium having
ongoing growth is to be sustained. Above, φ implies that installation costs depend
on private investment, ı, as well as on the governmental input, Gs. Since the latter
is a function of total public expenditure, individual and aggregate private capital
as well as of the degree of congestion, installation costs are aﬀected via several
channels: Due to φ > 0 an increase in private investment, ı, rises installation costs
whereas they are reduced with an increase in Gs. Consequently, all parameters of
(2) also aﬀect the installation costs. All things being equal, Gs increases with G
and k. This results directly from the complementarity of both inputs within (2).
3The relationship between the general production function (1) and the linear form (3) can be
found in Appendix A.
4With this speciﬁcation our model carries on the investment theory which derives from the
Tobin q theory that focuses on the impact of adjustment costs (see Hayashi (1982)). A survey of
relevant approaches is given by Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) or Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
whereas recent empirical studies can be found in Hall (2004). An industry speciﬁc discussion is
done by Caballero and Engel (1999). Usually, those authors who focus on capital adjustment costs
model them as ratio between the investment in each period or time increment respectively and
the ﬁrm’s capital stock. An exception is the paper of Turnovsky (1996) who develops a one–sector
endogenous growth model in which capital investment incurs adjustment costs that are related to
governmental activity.
4Hence, installation costs of a given amount of investment decrease with a rise in
the individual capital stock, k, or public investment, G. This assumption resembles
the usual ﬁnding that the higher the capital stock of a ﬁrm, the lower are the in-
stallation costs. Moreover, installation costs are lower in an opportune industrial
area (higher G). The contrary is true for aggregate capital, K, whereas the impact
of congestion is more sophisticated and details are discussed below. Note that in
contrast to private capital, the aggregate capital is exogenous to the individual ﬁrm.
Private investment, ı, determines capital accumulation according to
ı = ˙ k + δk (5)
with the rate of capital depreciation denoted by δ.
Institutional and ﬁscal policies As usual within this type of growth model we refer
to ﬁscal policies with respect to those activities that aﬀect tax policies or the ﬁx-
ing of a certain amount of the governmental input. We extend the corresponding
policy implications with respect to institutional arguments thereby borrowing from
Turnovsky (1996, p. 363) who argues:
’...the degree of congestion is to some extent the outcome of a policy
decision, and once determined, the degree of congestion turns out to be
a critical determinant of optimal tax policy.’
This statement makes clear that governmental policy by all means includes ﬁscal
policy.5 But, over and above, governmental policy also aﬀects the prevailing degree
of congestion. This is done via the provision of a certain type of governmental input,
e. g. basic research or a road network or a regional public good. To keep the analysis
simple we assume that each region is only equipped with one type of governmental
input.
Furthermore, we lean against North (1990) who argues that institutions cover a
variety of diﬀerent economic, social and legal arrangements that partly result from
the political process. To provide a framework for the discussion we combine these
arguments and interpret the actual degree of congestion as being the outcome of
alternative institutional settings. In addition to this they also include eﬀorts of the
government with respect to the size of the region as determined by the number
5The corresponding growth impact is discussed in detail in the cited paper.
5of ﬁrms. In the following part of the paper we refer to institutional policies as to
those that determine the type of public input that is provided by the government6
and to regulations concerning the extent of the region. To sum up the formal
implementation of alternative governmental policies: Fiscal policies tie up to the
provision of g and the underlying tax rates whereas institutional policies focus on



















Figure 1: Coherences within the model
Figure 1 summarizes the coherences within the model. The individually available
public input, Gs, as well as its constituents, G,k,K and σ, has a signiﬁcant impact
on both, output and installation costs (see (1) and (4)). This is illustrated by the
vertical arrows. Within each function the signs below the constituents expose either
a positive or a negative impact on the dependent variable. Regional and institutional
6Anyhow, the degree of congestion is still exogenous and we do not endogenize institutional
policies but analyze the impact of alternative (exogenously given) institutional settings on the
region’s performance.
6arguments enter the model as illustrated by the dashed box. Institutional arrange-
ments are represented by the degree of rivalry, σ, and comparisons of alternative
regions may be executed by considerations of alternative sizes of N.
Lifetime utility, individual resource constraint, and private investment The inﬁnitely








with constant utility discounting, ρ > 0, and constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, ε.7 The individual decides about the utility maximizing consumption
path according to the budget constraint
(1 − τy)y = (1 + τc)c + (1 − τı)ı(1 + φ) (7)
where τy is the income tax rate, τc denotes the consumption tax rate, and τı is the
investment subsidy rate. The ﬁscal parameters are set by the government and are
considered to be exogenous and constant within individual utility maximization.
3 Decentralized economy
The individual’s problem is to choose the rate of consumption, c, of investment, ı,
and of capital accumulation, k, to maximize (6) subject to the budget constraint







+ λ[(1 − τy)f − (1 + τc)c − (1 − τı)ı(1 + φ)] + qλ
 
ı − δk − ˙ k
  
(8)
where λ is the shadow value of wealth in the form of new output and qλ is the
shadow value of the agent’s capital stock. Analysis of the model is simpliﬁed by
using the shadow value of wealth as numeraire. Consequently, q is deﬁned to be the
market value of capital in terms of the (unitary) price of new output.
7This speciﬁcation of individual utility, which is quite usual in growth theory, is necessary in
order to allow for steady state growth.
8We analyze households who are consumers and producers of the homogenous output at the
same time. Equivalently, we could formulate households who supply capital and one unit of labor,
and buy the consumption good, and ﬁrms which pay for the used production factors and supply
the consumption good. The results would not be aﬀected.
7The necessary conditions which determine optimal consumption, investment and
capital accumulation result in9
c
− 1
ε = λ(1 + τc) (9a)

















−ρt = 0 (10)
has to be met, too.
Condition (9a) equates marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of
wealth, λ, which is given in units of new output. Condition (9b) equates the
marginal installation costs to the market value of capital, q. Since marginal invest-
ment costs are nondecreasing with ı/Gs, either an increase in private investment
or a decrease in the available public input raises the equilibrium market value of
capital, ∂q/∂(ı/Gs) > 0. Condition (9c) determines optimal capital accumulation
and reﬂects the results of the standard Keynes–Ramsey–Rule. Marginal return on
consumption (RHS) is equilibrated with the rate of return on acquiring an additional
unit of physical capital (LHS). The return on an additional unit of physical capital
is composed of the following elements: (i) (1 − τy)fk/q: after tax output per unit
of installed capital (valued at the price q), (ii) ˙ q/q − δ: (net) rate of capital gain,
(iii) (1−τı)ıφk/q: reﬂects the fact that an additional resource of beneﬁts of a higher
capital stock is to reduce the installation costs associated with future investment.
We now derive the equilibrium growth rate of the decentralized economy. The rep-
resentative agent in making his individual investment decision assumes that he has
a negligible impact on the aggregate capital stock and therefore ignores the linkages
between its own investment decision and the resulting capital stock. This misper-
ception is the source of a potential externality generated by capital accumulation.
Formally this may be illustrated by the way how ﬁrms perceive their individually
available amount of the public input during the process of capital accumulation.






≥ 0 if σ ≥ 0 (11)
9Except in tax rates and in Gs, indices within this paper refer to partial derivatives of a function
with respect to the argument that is indexed.
8The ﬁrms’ usage seems to increase with a rise in the individual physical capital.
This positive eﬀect is inﬂuenced via three channels: (i) the absolute size of the
government, G, (ii) the prevailing degree of congestion, σ and (iii) the scale of
the economy, N.10 While the ﬁrst eﬀect is widely discussed within the congestion
literature, the analysis usually is reduced to situations where σ ≤ 1 and N = 1.
Most of the existing models refrain from making statements about the economic
impact of local public goods and of the size of the economy.
The economy’s growth rate may be derived from the ﬁrst order conditions (9c)
and ˆ λ from (9a) which provides ˆ c. A closed form solution of the model requires a










b ≥ 0 (12)
Hence installation costs are quadratic and amount to











q/(1 − τı) − 1
2b
(14)
With this the decentralized growth rate results as





(q − (1 − τı))2gσN1−σ
(1 − τı)q4b





It is composed of the net marginal product of capital including adjustment costs, the
rate of time preference and the growth rate of the market value of capital. The latter
is proved to be constant in equilibrium as a situation in which all macroeconomic
variables grow at a constant and equal rate.
10Note that actually K = Nk due to the homogeneity of the individuals and hence the conges-
tion function (2) is modiﬁed to Gs = GN−σ. The positive eﬀect of individual capital on Gs is
compensated by the negative impact of the simultaneous increase in aggregate capital. However,
the individual misperception of the productivity of the public input leads to suboptimal over-
accumulation of private capital whenever σ > 0. In case of the public input as pure public good
(σ = 0) individually perceived and actual productivity of the public input coincide (see Turnovsky
(1996) for a detailed discussion of policy implications of this argument in the context of a growth
model with adjustment costs.)
9To specify the market value of capital, q, equation (9c), ˆ λ from (9a) and (14) are
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Altogether, the decentralized equilibrium is then deﬁned by the growth rate (15)
together with qd from (17). Due to the discussed externality decentralized capi-
tal accumulation it is not optimal but ﬁscal and/or institutional policies would be
required in order to internalize the market failures.
4 Interdependencies between ﬁscal and institutional
policies and welfare
To assess the welfare implications of the decentralized equilibrium it is necessary
to compare it to the ﬁrst–best optimum. Causal for the deviation between ﬁrst–
best and market equilibrium are diﬀerent perceptions of the congestion functions
(see (2) and (C.1)). To keep the presentation concise Table 1 provides the most
important equations. Since the underlying mathematics are analogous to those
in the last section we relegate them into Appendix C and focus on a comparison
of the results. As illustrated in Section 2 the discussion incorporates the impact
of ﬁscal and institutional policies (changes in g, N, σ) on the production eﬀect
whenever capital productivity is concerned whereas the adjustment cost eﬀect refers
to implications of the analyzed policies for the adjustment costs.
11The quadratic equation (17) has two solutions. Within Appendix B it is shown that only qd
as presented by (16) is a feasible solution.
10Since we assume a balanced budget in each period the governmental size is deter-
mined by the sum of expenditures that equal total tax revenues. The optimal size of
the government may not be determined explicitly but it is nevertheless worthwhile
to think about it for the following reasons: It is possible (i) to compare the govern-
ment’s size to the one in an economy without adjustment costs and (ii) to illustrate









1−σ = 1 (18)
The left–hand side measures the welfare beneﬁts of a unit increase in government
expenditure. These include: (i) the marginal beneﬁts to the productivity of existing
capital, fg/k (see (C.6)), and (ii) the marginal beneﬁts from reducing the costs
associated with installing new capital. An optimum requires that these marginal
beneﬁts equal the unit resource costs they absorb. Note that if N = 1 the optimal
governmental size is independent of the degree of rivalry.12 If instead N > 1, both,
the population size and the nature of the public input as incorporated within the
term N1−σ determine the resulting value of g∗.
Consequently it is possible to analyze the impact of institutional policies – as for-
malized by changes of N and/or σ – on the optimal ﬁscal policy – as formalized by g.
Or said in other words, since g∗ is aﬀected by the size of the economy and the type
of governmental input it is not possible to determine ﬁscal policy independent of
institutional decisions. Taking a more precise look at the linkages within the model
two cases are to be distinguished:
(i) φ = 0: In case that the governmental input has no impact on investment costs, the
corresponding beneﬁts do not arise and optimal governmental expenditure is given
if α′(gN1−σ) = 1. Increases (decreases) in N1−σ then induce a decreased (increased)
equilibrium level g∗. Alternative types of governmental inputs as represented by
diﬀerent degrees of congestion aﬀect the optimal governmental size: Given N > 1,
an increase in congestion leads to an increase in the optimal governmental size.
The higher the degree of rivalry of the provided public input, the larger is the
optimal amount of the public input in order to compensate for decreased individual
availability. Aside from this, the nature of the public input is important since N1−σ
increases (decreases) with N as long as σ < 1(σ > 1). As long as the public input
12This is a well–known result within congestion models that normalize population size to unity.
11is partially congested (σ < 1), the total amount of the public input can grow at a
smaller rate than population does (and hence aggregate capital) in order to keep
the individually available amount of the public input constant. Hence the optimal
relative governmental size g∗ decreases with a rise in N if the public expenditure is
partially congested whereas g∗ rises with N in case of regional public inputs.
(ii) φ > 0: If adjustment costs arise, the marginal beneﬁts from reduced installation
costs allow for a decrease of the required marginal beneﬁts from capital. The term
α′ is reduced thus increasing g∗. Hence compared to a situation without adjustment
costs the optimal governmental size is increased since the governmental input does
not only act as production input but also reduces adjustment costs. With respect to
the impact of the nature of the public input the argumentation from above continues
to hold. To sum up: adjustment costs bring about increases of the optimal size of
the governmental input. As long as we allow for alternative regional sizes (N > 1)
also institutional policies aﬀect the optimal size of the governmental input and with
this ﬁscal policy.13
The ﬁrst–best optimum is composed of the optimal size of the government, g∗, and






− δ − ρ
 
(19)
Both, g∗ and ˆ c∗, are aﬀected by the market value of capital, q∗, that also has to be




y,g) + 2η∗) − 2g∗(1 − N1−σ)
ερ − (1 − ε)δ + 2g∗N1−σ (20)
Welfare implications Henceforth we assume that the expenditure ratio is set opti-
mally, g = g∗, neglect tax rates and focus on the impact of alternative degrees of
congestion and/or sizes of the region. In other words said: We analyze the implica-
tions of alternative institutional policies within the model. In doing so we begin with
the analysis of the components of both growth rates, ˆ c and (ˆ c)∗, as given by (15) and
(19). These include identical rates of time preference, ρ, and depreciation, δ. The
13Note that since the optimal value of g may not be determined explicitly it is not possible to
ﬁnd a closed–form solution of the ﬁrst–best optimum. We work on this problem in Section 5 where
we specify the production technology by a Cobb–Douglas production function.
14The term η∗
y,g = ∂y/∂g g/y = ∂α/∂g g/α within the growth rate denotes the partial production
elasticity of the public input.
12arising diﬀerences are due to alternative perceptions of the congestion function and
aﬀect the marginal product of capital, fk (thus inducing a production eﬀect), as well
as the market value of capital, q, and the marginal reduction of future adjustment
costs, φk, in various ways (thus inducing an adjustment cost eﬀect).
Table 1: Optimal and decentralized determinants
planner market equilibrium
congestion Gs = gN1−σk Gs = gkσK1−σ
production y = α(gN1−σ)k y = α(gkσ−1K1−σ)k
g∗ α′(g∗N1−σ) +
(q∗−1)2
4b N1−σ = 1
fk f∗
k = α(g∗N1−σ)(1 − η∗) fd
k = α(gN1−σ)   (1 − (1 − σ)η)
growth rate ˆ c∗ = ε
 
α(g∗N1−σ)(1−η∗)
q − δ − ρ
 
see (15)

















k ≤ 0 ⇔ σ ≥ 0
(i) The marginal product of capital, as perceived by the individuals, exceeds the
optimal one whenever the public input is characterized by rivalry. The gap between
both unequivocally increases with σ since this spurs the incentive to accumulate
capital: the individually available amount of the public input, Gs, seems to be
related stronger to the individual capital stock.15
(ii) The decentralized market value of capital coincides with the optimal one if and
only if the social capital return equals the private capital return and if the public
production input is characterized by proportional congestion (σ = 1). This requires
a very speciﬁc combination of ﬁscal and institutional policies. The usage of the
15As argued above, this is the consequence of the external eﬀect of capital accumulation as
discussed within the congestion literature. If congestion is proportional and given that labor
is supplied inelastically a distortionary income tax may be used to reduce the private capital
accumulation activity. The corresponding governmental revenues suﬃce to ﬁnance the optimal
amount of the public input (see e. g. Barro (1990) or Turnovsky (2000)).
13entire public input is equally distributed among the individuals and each may use
1/N parts. If σ  = 1 and all things being equal the prevailing degree of congestion
drives a wedge between qd and q∗.
(iii) The static dimension of the adjustment costs as incorporated by φı is directly
aﬀected by the actual level of the market value of capital, q. The optimal and the
decentralized values only coincide under the very speciﬁc assumption q∗ = qd and
the above statements again become relevant.
(iv) The dynamic dimension of adjustment costs (namely reduced costs in the fu-
ture), as measured by φk, may be suboptimally high or low, depending on the level
of q and the prevailing degree of congestion. All things being equal and given that
q∗ = qd the following results can be derived: As long as σ < 1 the corresponding
ratio between private and public investment, ı/Gs, is suboptimally low thus spurring
growth.16 But note that this eﬀect becomes weaker with increasing σ. If the public
input is proportionally congested, σ = 1, the optimal ratio between private and
public investment is realized and the individuals correctly perceive φk. However, if
the governmental input is a regional public good, σ > 1, the individuals perceive
the ratio ı/Gs as being higher than the actual one and hence they do not realize
future reductions of investment costs up to their full extent. This chokes capital
accumulation and thus reduces the growth rate. Hence the growth impact of future
adjustment cost reductions is considerably determined by the nature of the public
input.
To sum up: Aside from positive growth eﬀects of congestion, as those that arise
in the context of capital productivity, also negative eﬀects of congestion may be
identiﬁed. Neither for the general nor for the linear production technologies it is
possible to derive the optimal value of g∗. With this we may not illustrate the ﬁrst–
best optimum explicitly and compare it to the decentralized decisions. However, the
usual argumentation as carried out within the majority of growth models continues
to hold: Congestion induces externalities thus driving a wedge between decentralized
and ﬁrst–best optimum. Fiscal policy in form of taxes may then be used in order
to correct for the market distortions and additionally to ﬁnance the provision of
g∗. Hence any optimal ﬁscal policy must also correct for any arising externalities
and not only take care about the eﬃcient provision of the optimal amount of the
governmental input.
16This is hardly amazing as it follows the usual logic of the congestion models.
145 Numerical simulations
Regional policies frequently pursue the goal to maximize the growth rate. In the
context of our model this could be achieved via several channels, namely ﬁscal and
institutional policies. We now focus on the implications of alternative governmental
sizes, g, and institutional arrangements, σ and/or N, and on the decentralized
equilibrium as given by (15) and (17). The numerical simulations will be carried




s , 0 < β < 1, A > 0 (21)
where A denotes the technological level of the economy. The decentralized marginal
product of capital then amounts to
fk = [β + σ(1 − β)]A(gN
1−σ)
1−β (22)
To illustrate the diﬀerent eﬀects of governmental policy on the equilibrium growth
rate we use the parameter speciﬁcations in Table 2.
Table 2: Calibration parameters
production β = 0.7
A = 0.4
δ = 0.05
Taste and size of the economy ρ = 0.03
ε = 0.3
N = 1,2,3
Adjustment costs b = 0.5
Governmental activity τı = 0
τy = 0
g = 0.0625,0.125
Congestion σ = 0,1.5
Economic impact of governmental size We begin the discussion with an analysis of
the impact of alternative sizes of the government, g, on the resulting market value of
15capital, qd, and on the growth rate, ˆ c. Due to the relation g = G/K = G/Y ∗Y/K,
the level of g may be interpreted as representing the expenditure ratio. We assume
a capital coeﬃcient equal to K/Y = 4. Then an expenditure ratio G/Y = 0.25
corresponds to g = 0.0625 whereas G/Y = 0.5 is represented by g = 0.125.17 A
graphical illustration for alternative sizes of the economy is given within Figure 2.
Bold lines represent a public input as local public good (σ = 1.5) whereas thin lines
correspond to a pure public good (σ = 0).
As can be seen within Figures 2(a), 2(c) and 2(e), the equilibrium market value of
capital decreases with a rising expenditure ratio. This relationship holds for all sizes
of the economy and for all types of public goods. Bigger governments imply a higher
level of GS and reduces the ratio between private and public investment, ı/Gs. This
lowers the adjustment costs, φ, and the market value of capital, qd, is reduced.
Independent of the size of the economy the equilibrium value of capital is always
higher in case of the uncongested public input than in case of a regional public good
(bold lines always above thin lines). This is caused by the fact that increased rivalry
reduces the ratio ı/Gs, thus increases φ and with this qd. Furthermore, the wedge
between both functions in each subﬁgure increases with the size of the economy. This
result is due to value of σ = 1 that separates the less than proportionally congested
inputs from regional public goods: If σ < 1, an increase in N also increases G since
the ratio g = G/K is constant. Then each ﬁrm disposes of more governmental
input than before as long as congestion is less than proportional. This reduces
the decentralized market value of capital, qd. The thin lines shift downwards with
an increased size of the economy. The opposite applies in case of the governmental
input as regional public good, σ > 1. Then an increase in N reduces the individually
available amount of the public input thus ending up in a higher market value of
capital, qd. The bold lines shift upwards and altogether the wedge between both
lines rises.
The corresponding relationships between the growth rate and the government’s size
can be seen in Figures 2(b), 2(d) and 2(f). Again, ˆ c unequivocally increases with
g. This is due to the complementarity of both production inputs; fk unequivocally
rises with g. But depending on the economy’s size, either the growth impact of a
regional public good (N = 1: bold line above thin line) or of the pure public good
17It is also possible to analyze even higher or lower levels of the expenditure ratio. The structural
results of the model would not be aﬀected.








(a) q(g) if N = 1







(b) ˆ c(g) if N = 1









(c) q(g) if N = 2







(d) ˆ c(g) if N = 2
















(f) ˆ c(g) if N = 3
Figure 2: The impact of governmental size, g, on the level of q and ˆ c.
Bold lines correspond to local public goods (σ = 1.5) whereas thin
lines reﬂect pure public goods (σ = 0)
(N = 3: thin line above bold line) overweighs. This result is due to the ambiguous
productivity eﬀect: Taking the ﬁrst derivative of (22) with respect to the degree of
rivalry illustrates
∂fk
∂σ ≷ 0 ⇔ lnN ≶ 1/(β+σ(1−β)). There exists a ’critical size’ of
the economy, determined by lnN and in the following denoted by ˜ N that determines
whether increased rivalry enhances or reduces private capital productivity. Similarly
it is possible to derive a ’critical degree of congestion’, in the following denoted by
˜ σ. Capital productivity is an essential part of the growth rate and it is possible to
illustrate the ambiguity of the growth eﬀect also by simulation. For the assumed
calibration parameters the critical values are given by ˜ N(σ = 0) = 4.17 and ˜ N(σ =
1.5) = 2.39 respectively. Analogously it is possible to determine a critical size of
the degree of congestion, denoted by ˜ σ = 1/(1 − β)[1/(lnN) − β]. It is given by
˜ σ(N = 3) = 0.70 and ˜ σ(N = 2) = 2.48 respectively. If N lies below the ’critical
value’, ˜ N, the productivity enhancing eﬀect of an increased size of the economy
17dominates. In case of a suﬃciently big region (N > ˜ N) the negative scale eﬀect
within fk becomes dominant. Since this eﬀect is reinforced by σ the growth eﬀect of
a regional public good is smaller than it is the case if Gs is a pure public production
input.
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(e) q(σ) if N = 3








(f) ˆ c(σ) if N = 3
Figure 3: The impact of rivalry, σ, on the level of q and ˆ c.
Bold lines correspond to a ’big’ government (g = 0.125) whereas
thin lines represent a ’lean’ government (g = 0.0625)
Economic impact of institutional arrangements Within governmental policies the
determinants of institutional arrangements also have to be chosen and additionally
aﬀect the equilibrium. These arrangements may be interpreted as the prevailing
degree of congestion and/or the size of the economy, i. e. the government may
decide about the nature of the public input provided or on its endeavors to settle
ﬁrms. In the context of this approach it is also possible to analyze the impact of
institutional changes on the resulting equilibrium. Again we focus on the market
value of capital as well as on the growth rate and discuss how they are determined
18via alternative σ and N. A graphical illustration can be found in Figure 3. Bold
lines correspond to ’big’ governments (g = 0.125) whereas thin lines reﬂect ’lean’
governments (g = 0.0625) as introduced above.
As can be seen within Figures 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e), the market value of capital in
the decentralized economy increases with σ for all sizes of the economy. Again the
intuition behind this result is as follows: a rise in rivalry reduces the individual
available amount of the public input, this increase the ratio between private and
public investment so that adjustment costs increase and hence also the market value
of capital. Besides, for a given size of the economy, qd is always higher in case of
relatively small governments (thin lines above bold). This is due to the fact that
not only an increase in σ but also a decrease in the size of the government (smaller
g) reduce Gs, thus rising the corresponding level of qd. If σ = 0, the initial value
of q reduces with N since this rises Gs and with this reduces qd. Independent of
the government’s size, g, the market value of capital, qd, rises more slowly with σ in
case of a relatively small region.
Figures 3(b), 3(d) and 3(f) again incorporate the conjunction of production and
adjustment cost eﬀect. Due to the complementarity of the inputs, the growth rate
is always higher in case of a big government (bold lines above thin lines). This
reﬂects the already discussed argument that more governmental activity increases
private capital productivity and with this growth.
However, the results become more sophisticated with respect to institutional policies.
If N = 1 the growth rate unequivocally increases with σ. This results because of the
externality of private capital accumulation. The individuals perceive the availability
of the governmental input to be related stricter to their own capital stock. The result
change if N > 1. Then the growth rate increases until the above discussed ’critical
value’ ˜ N is reached. A further increase in N then induces a decreasing marginal
product of capital. Altogether the production eﬀect is positive until ˜ N is reached and
then becomes negative. While the production eﬀect is ambiguous, the adjustment
cost eﬀect unequivocally increases with σ. Similarly the impact of the degree of
congestion can be analyzed. Putting the eﬀects together it is possible to derive a
growth maximizing degree of rivalry. This latter is the smaller the higher N, since
then the adjustment cost eﬀect becomes more and more dominant.
The model has also been calibrated with respect to the parameters in Table 2. Nu-
19Table 3: Equilibrium values of qd and ˆ c; CD technology (21)
q ˆ c(%)
g = 0.0625 g = 0.125 g = 0.0625 g = 0.125
N = 1 σ = 0 1.75024 1.45543 -0.31097 0.69287
σ = 1 1.91767 1.56707 0.73546 2.08837
σ = 1.5 2.00845 1.62607 1.30281 2.82587
N = 2 σ = 0 1.45543 1.27752 0.69287 1.93804
σ = 1 1.91767 1.56707 0.73456 2.08837
σ = 1.5 2.28690 1.79358 0.68733 2.01430
N = 3 σ = 0 1.34087 1.20755 1.39134 2.78304
σ = 1 1.91767 1.56707 0.73456 2.08837
σ = 1.5 2.48818 1.91261 0.37001 1.58621
merical results for the market value of capital and the growth rate under alternative
ﬁscal and institutional arrangements can be found in table 3. This illustrates the
impact of (i) alternative governmental sizes for given N and σ, or (ii) alternative
regional sizes for given g and σ, or (iii) alternative degrees of congestion for given
g and N. The shaded values especially clarify that for a certain given size of the
region changes in the type of governmental input may or may not increase growth
depending on the prevailing degree of congestion. If we consider e. g. a region that is
twice as large as the reference region a transition from the provision of a pure public
good to a more congested public input at ﬁrst spurs growth. Given that g = 0.0625
the growth rate increases from ˆ c = 0.69287 to ˆ c = 0.73456 or in case of g = 0.125
from ˆ c = 1.93804 to ˆ c = 2.08837 respectively. A further increase in congestion (or
the provision of a regional public good) reduces the growth rate. These result hold
independent of the government’s size. Hence the instrument that initially is apt to
spur growth fails if a critical value of congestion, here ˜ σ = 0.70, is exceeded.
To sum up: The simulation as well as the calibration results make clear that a growth
maximizing policy may be unequivocally realized if the government provides more
20of the complementary production input. However, the result diﬀers with respect to
the region’s size and the characteristics of the public production input: While the
government in relatively small regions should provide local public inputs another
result applies for relatively big regions. Then governmental production inputs that
have the characteristics of pure public goods, e. g. basic research, contribute better to
maximizing growth. It is also imaginable that for a certain regional size a transition
to a more congested production input at ﬁrst spurs growth and then reduces it.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the growth impact of ﬁscal and institutional governmental poli-
cies in a regional context. The government provides a productive input that is
complementary to private capital. Institutional policies determine the type of gov-
ernmental input provided as well as the decision on number of ﬁrms that are settled,
that is the region’s size. Fiscal policies decide on the extent of the public input and
it is assumed that the governmental budget balances each period. Private capital
accumulation incurs adjustment costs that depend upon the ratio between private
and public investment. Due to the model speciﬁcation the governmental input af-
fects private capital productivity thus inducing a production eﬀect. In addition also
adjustment costs are inﬂuenced hence the governmental input also incorporates an
adjustment cost eﬀect.
With introducing adjustment costs, an optimal ﬁscal policy is more complex since
the decentralized growth rate is also considerably determined by the market value
of capital. The latter is a positive function of the ratio between private and public
investment and with this aﬀects adjustment costs. These incorporate a static di-
mension (the more private investment the higher are the costs in each period) and
a dynamic dimension (investment in one period contributes to an increase in the
existing capital stock and with this reduces future investment costs).
After deriving the decentralized equilibrium, ﬁscal and institutional policies as well
as their welfare implications are discussed. Due to congestion externalities the
marginal product of capital as perceived by the individuals exceeds the optimal
one whenever congestion arises. Hence decentralized and the ﬁrst–best optimum do
not coincide. However, some statements about the optimal ratio between the gov-
21ernment and aggregate capital may be derived: It decreases with the region’s size
as long as the public production input is partially congested whereas the opposite
applies if the governmental input is a pure public good. Since it is not possible
to derive closed–form solutions of the equilibria the optimal tax policy may not be
derived explicitly.
We therefore specify the production function and focus on the growth eﬀects of
alternative ﬁscal and institutional policies via carrying out comparative analysis.
This is done in the context of a Cobb–Douglas production technology and for two
alternative and exogenously given sizes of the government. Several results are de-
rived from simulation and calibration: (i) Bigger governments reduce the market
value of capital for all degrees of congestion and for all sizes of the economy. Hence
increasing the size of the government unequivocally spurs growth. (ii) In smaller
economies the provision of local public inputs goes along with a bigger growth eﬀect
than the provision of pure public goods. However, the opposite applies to relatively
bigger economies. Then the growth eﬀect of pure public goods exceeds that of re-
gional public goods. (iii) Independent of the size of the economy, the market value
of capital increases with rivalry and decreases with the size of the government. (iv)
For all sizes of the economy that exceed unity there exists a critical population size
that separates the cases in which increasing congestion spurs growth from those that
reduce growth. Similarly a critical size of the degree of congestion may be derived.
The discussion clariﬁes that regional growth strategies have to bear in mind very
precisely several facts, among them the relative size of the region and the type
of the governmental input. Due to the speciﬁcation of the production technology
and the adjustment costs the public input has a double positive impact: on the
one hand it increases private capital productivity and on the other hand it lowers
today’s and future adjustment costs. Both eﬀects raise the growth rate. Basically
a regional growth strategy may include several multiple components, namely the
decision on the type of the governmental input for a given size of the region or a
directed settling policy for a given regional endowment with public goods. In order
to increase growth relatively small regions should provide public inputs with a higher
degree of congestion than relatively large regions. Due to the feedback eﬀects within
the model both policies may not be determined independently, if the goal to increase
growth is to be pursued. It is thus important to coordinate ﬁscal and institutional
policies very carefully.
22Appendix
A: Relationship between general production function and in-
tensive form
As the production function (1) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in the
two arguments k and Gs, Euler’s theorem implies







Taking the total diﬀerential of (1) leads to







Using the congestion function (2) together with g = G





dk . So any production function having the above homogeneity








B: Derivation of (17)
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We restrict on parameter values which lead to real values of q, that is to positive
values of ∆. Since the second term of ∆ ist positive,
√
∆ > 1 − εσ − 2b(ερ − (1 −
ε)δ)/(gN1−σ). Hence, q2 is negative and the unique solution for the steady state
value of capital results in
23C: First–best optimum
The ﬁrst–best optimum reﬂects the decisions of the central planner who possesses
complete information and chooses all quantities directly, taking into account the
congestion caused by all agents and ﬁxing the size of the governmental input. Using
K = Nk and g = G/K, the congestion function (2) modiﬁes to
Gs = gN
1−σk (C.1)
and with this the planner’s production function is given by
y = f(Gs,k) = α(gN
1−σ)k (C.2)
The formal optimization is to maximize the agent’s utility (6) subject to (5) and
the economy–wide resource constraint
f = c + gk + ı(1 + φ) (C.3)
The resulting Hamiltonian is similar to (8) and the corresponding ﬁrst–order condi-
tions imply
c
−1/ε = λ (C.4a)















Equation (C.4b) determines the optimal ratio between private and public invest-
ment, ı
Gs, as function of q. Note that the term φı is also a function of this ratio. It
is thus necessary to use the speciﬁed function (12) in order to solve (C.4b) for ı/Gs.









An optimum requires that both, the growth rate, (ˆ c)∗, as well as the size of the
government, g∗, have to be set optimally. The latter is determined by the planner’s
optimization problem and leads to the additional optimality condition
fg − k − ıφg = 0 (C.6)
24Utilizing (C.2), (C.5) and rearranging illustrates that the optimal value of g may be








1−σ = 1 (C.7)
Together with φ∗
k = −φ′ı/(Gsk) and Gs/k = gN1−σ as well as ˙ q = 0 in the steady
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(C.9)
It includes the value of capital that may be derived from setting ˙ q = 0 in (C.4c) and




y,g) + 2η∗) − 2g∗(1 − N1−σ)
ερ − (1 − ε)δ + 2g∗N1−σ (C.10)
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